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HOW BROAD IS THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND PERSONAL
AUTONOMY? – ON WHAT GROUNDS
SHOULD THE BAN ON THE SALE OF
SEXUALLY STIMULATING DEVICES BE
CONSIDERED UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
MAGGIE ILENE KAMINER∗
INTRODUCTION
Recently, Alabama and Louisiana state courts issued permanent
injunctions against laws that banned the sale of sexual devices used
1
primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs. Both state
courts issued injunctions for the same reason; the statutes did not
2
pass mere rational basis review. These cases were not the first of
their kind. The state courts in Georgia, Texas, Colorado, and Kansas
also evaluated arguments on the constitutionality of comparably
worded statutes.3 Like the Alabama and Louisiana statutes, the
∗
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1. See Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999), rev’d in part and remanded in
part, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001); Louisiana v. Brenan, 739 So. 2d 368 (1st Cir. 1999).
2. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (holding that the right to
assisted suicide is not a fundamental right and therefore the ban on it only needs to be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525
(1934) (outlining the process of analysis for claims alleging a violation of the due process clause
and holding that the due process clause only requires that a law not be “unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained.”). Rational review is used when there is no fundamental right or suspect
class in question. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Tooley v. Seven ThirtyFive E. Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985); Sewell v. State, 233 S.E.2d 187, 188 (Ga. 1977);
State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1990) (addressing the constitutionality of a state obscenity
statute which bans the sale of genital stimulating devices).
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Colorado and Kansas statutes were found unconstitutional.
However, the courts in Colorado5 and Kansas6 based their decisions
on the fundamental right to privacy.
This Comment argues that although all four state courts correctly
held the statutes unconstitutional, the Alabama and Louisiana courts
based their holdings on an incorrect legal foundation and should
ground their decision under a fundamental right to privacy
framework. The Comment focuses on the right of individuals,
particularly women, to use these devices in the privacy of their home,
a right that is inextricably denied when the sale of such devices is
banned. These arguments that invoke the Fourteenth Amendment
right to sexual privacy are based on the Supreme Court cases that
involve the fundamental rights associated with the “personal
intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, [and]
procreation.”7
Part I briefly traces the history and attitude towards women and
their sexuality. Part II presents the Constitutional framework for
evaluating claims of substantive due process violations. Part III argues
that the fundamental right to privacy necessarily includes the right to
sexual privacy. Part IV addresses the state’s attempts to use
“obscenity” to justify the ban on the sale of genital stimulating
devices. Part V addresses the factual and legislative history behind
each case and explains why the Alabama and Louisiana state courts
made correct decisions, but applied deficient legal reasoning. Part V
also asserts that the analysis offered by the courts in Colorado and
Kansas is the correct way to determine what kind of protection the
statutes deserve, by recognizing the breadth and importance of a
fundamental right to privacy. Part VI is a reanalysis of the courts
decision in Williams v. Pryor in light of the Eleventh Circuit holding
that reverses and remands the lower court’s decision.8 Finally, the
conclusion recommends that the Court use the undue burden test9 to
4. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(2) (1999) (criminalizing the promotion or intent to
promote any obscene device, including a dildo or artificial vagina designed to stimulate the
human genital organs); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (1995) (criminalizing and defining the
promotion or sale of obscene devices, such as a dildo or artificial vagina used primarily for the
stimulation of human genitals).
5. See Tooley, 697 P.2d at 370 (holding that broad proscription on the sale of sexually
stimulating devices impermissibly burdens the right of privacy).
6. See Hughes, 792 P.2d at 618 (holding that the statute impermissibly infringes on the
constitutional right to privacy in one’s home and in his or her doctor’s or therapist’s office).
7. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1973).
8. See 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001).
9. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (holding that a statute that
imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to decide whether to have an abortion violates
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expand the existing fundamental right of privacy to include the right
to sexual privacy, thereby including the right to obtain and use
genital stimulating devices.
I. HISTORY OF SEXUAL VIEWS IN AMERICA
For women, sex has always been a political issue,10 and as a result
women have always been censored in their efforts to gain sexual
freedom.11 This discussion examines the way our nation historically
and currently perceives female sexuality. Additionally, this section
explains why statutes that ban the sale of sexual devices invade the
fundamental right to privacy, and perpetuate the sexual repression of
women.12
Historically, sex was considered an act solely engaged in for the
13
purpose of procreation. Men and women alike subscribed to the
idea that “female purity was an asset for a family that wanted to rise in
14
the world.” Ministers even persuaded women that the only way to
remain “pure and pious” was through sexual restraint.15
Since the late 1800s, government-imposed restrictions have

her fundamental right of liberty under Due Process). This is a lower level of scrutiny than strict
scrutiny. See id.
10. See Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women’s Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 1097, 1147 (1994) (discussing the censorship of women in their effort to gain sexual and
reproductive freedom). Because women’s sexual and reproductive choices have become
increasingly subject to medical, legal, and corporate control, their bodies are becoming
political battlegrounds. Id. See also GARY F. KELLY, SEXUALITY TODAY 104 (3d ed. 1992)
(discussing Margaret Sanger, an activist and nurse, who pioneered the contraceptive rights
movement for women and founded the National Birth Control League).
11. See Meyer, supra note 10, at 1147 (arguing that women are defined by their sexuality
and reproductive capacity); DOROTHY MCBRIDE STETSON, WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE U.S.A.:
POLICY DEBATES AND GENDER ROLES 69 (asserting that although reproductive issues have been
in the public arena for the past two hundred years, efforts to establish public policy for
reproductive freedom is relatively recent); see also E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? THE
STRANGE HISTORY OF OUR MOST INTIMATE INSTITUTION 79 (1999) (detailing Margaret Sanger’s
arrest and the closure of her contraception clinic due to its “obscene” nature).
12. See HAROLD I. KAPLAN ET AL., SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 656 (7th ed. 1994) (stating that masturbation is the most frequently discussed,
condemned, and practiced form of sexual activity, nearly all men and seventy-five percent of
women masturbate sometime during their lives).
13. See GRAFF, supra note 11, at 53 (stating that for many centuries the “crime against
nature” included any sex that attempted to prevent conception. Husbands and wives who tried
to prevent pregnancy were thought of as harlots and adulterers.).
14. SUSAN WOLOCH, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 123 (1984) (asserting sexual
restraint appeared to enhance a woman’s power within the home while at the same time,
serving the family’s goals).
15. See id. at 122 (explaining how ministers and doctors alike emphasized the debilitating
effect of sexual indulgence and promoted not only infrequent intercourse, but actually
confirmed female asexuality). “Passionlessness was an innate and commendable female
characteristic.” Id.
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impeded women’s efforts to gain equality both socially and sexually.
Male control of female sexuality assures male control over “the very
sphere, which had originally been one source of female power and
charisma.”17 For example, in 1873 Congress passed the Comstock
18
Laws, barring the use of the U.S. mail for the distribution of obscene
materials and articles regarding contraceptive devices.19 Women were
aware that the way to gain equal footing with men was by freeing
20
themselves from the constant constraint of motherhood. In 1931,
when the New York Academy of Sciences declared that contraception
was safe, and marriage was for more than just making babies,21
women achieved the first step toward equality.22 Ultimately, it was not
until 1965 that women won their freedom and the right to control
their bodies and to decide whether to engage in sex for procreation
or pleasure.23 Griswold v. Connecticut24 was the spark that set the
Supreme Court in motion for its future decisions involving personal
rights in the realm of sexual activity.25 This decision began an era of
26
decisions that recognized the right to female sexual autonomy.
16. See Lynn S. Chancer, Feminist Offensives: Defending Pornography and the Splitting of Sex from
Sexism, 48 STAN. L. REV. 739, 749 (1996) (reviewing NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING
PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS (1995)) (stating that
from the 1870s to the 1930s, the federal government used antiobscenity laws to prevent the
spread of information about birth control and sexual health).
17. ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMEN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 55,
129 (1976) (proposing that control over female sexuality is justified by the need to sustain a
patriarchal society that is dependant on mothers).
18. See STETSON, supra note 11, at 72 (discussing how Anthony Comstock successfully
lobbied in Congress to keep “smut” out of the U.S. Postal Service). Comstock equated
contraceptives with hard-core pornography. See id.
19. See id. (stating that by the beginning of the 1900s half of the States had versions of the
Comstock Act in place).
20. See GRAFF, supra note 11, at 78 (discussing the fact that use of contraceptive devices was
the only way for women to take their rightful place socially and sexually); see also Casey, 505 U.S.
at 835 (stating that women’s ability to control their reproductive lives facilitates their
participation in the economic and social realm of the nation).
21. See GRAFF, supra note 11, at 81; see also United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737, 738
(1936) (holding that contraception was not obscene, therefore making the Comstock laws
obsolete).
22. See GRAFF, supra note 11, at 80-81 (asserting that the right to use birth control was as
natural as women’s right to vote or own their own property).
23. See LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 199200 (1998) (asserting that the decision set forth in Griswold v. Connecticut ended the belief that
marriage was for procreation and instead, that “people might now marry for the explicit
purpose of having more and pleasurable sex.”).
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. See id. at 486 (holding that a law forbidding the use of contraceptives by married
people was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy).
26. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (making women’s right to privacy
fundamental by allowing women to decide whether to have an abortion); Planned Parenthood,
505 U.S. at 869 (reasserting that Roe’s holding that a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy
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Today, society openly acknowledges that a woman’s sexual pleasure
is not solely linked to procreation.27 By making the right to use
contraceptives fundamental,28 the Supreme Court necessarily makes
the right to sexual privacy fundamental. Therefore, there is no
29
justification for limiting the privacy right to use sexual devices.
Sexually stimulating devices are simply an alternative way of achieving
sexual pleasure, either alone or with a partner in the privacy of one’s
30
own bedroom.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
CLAIMS
A. What is a fundamental right?
Under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth
31
Amendment, a fundamental right is a constitutionally protected
right that deserves a heightened level of judicial scrutiny.32 The
Supreme Court has set forth two standards to determine whether an
33
asserted right is fundamental. The first standard states that “the
Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition, . . . and are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.”34 The second standard states, “‘substantive due process’
is a rule of law and a component of liberty).
27. See Meyer, supra note 10, at 1149 (arguing that the increase in information and newly
developed technology is making it possible for women to define a new sexual identity).
28. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (making the right to use contraceptives by married couples
fundamental); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (extending the right to
contraceptives to unmarried people, as well as married people).
29. But see Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1279 (invoking the Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720,
description of fundamental rights, such that the due process clause does not warrant sweeping
protection for all important, intimate, and personal decisions).
30. See Juli A. Morris, Challenging Sodomy Statutes: State Constitutional Protections for Sexual
Privacy, 66 IND. L.J. 609, 624 (1991) (concluding that it is time for courts to recognize that
private, adult, consensual sexual activity only affects the individuals involved and should not
concern the public).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (explaining that strict scrutiny is applied to any legislation that
interferes with a fundamental right). Specifically, the governmental actor must prove that the
action is justified by a compelling state interest and that the statute in question is narrowly
tailored to achieve the compelling interest, through the least restrictive means available. See id.
33. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (asserting that history and legal tradition guide the use of
these standards); see also Traci Shallbetter Stratton, No More Messing Around: Substantive Due
Process Challenges to Laws Prohibiting Fornication, 73 WASH. L. REV. 767, 769 (1998) (discussing
how the use of common law may be used to deem a right fundamental even if there is no
history surrounding it).
34. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (asserting that history and legal tradition guide the use of
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analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted
35
right . . . .”
When a law’s constitutionality is challenged, a court must
36
If a
determine whether a fundamental right is involved.
fundamental right is involved, the court applies a strict level of
judicial scrutiny corresponding to the disputed right.37 Statutes
38
evaluated under this standard rarely survive judicial review. When
the court is unable to find that the asserted substantive due process
violation involves a fundamental right, the challenged law will either
be evaluated under intermediate review39 or rational review.40
B. The Fundamental Right to Privacy
The right of citizens to be free from unwarranted governmental
41
intrusion is inherent in American society. Justice Brandeis’ dissent
42
in Olmstead v. United States laid the foundation for the Supreme
these standards); see, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (establishing
that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family because it is an institution that is so
deeply rooted in history and tradition); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (holding
the constitutional right of parents to be the primary decision makers for their children because
this is a strong Western Society tradition).
35. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
prevents the government from invading a fundamental interest unless the interest is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest).
36. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1993) (stating that strict scrutiny is
applied to the deprivation of whatever right the court deems fundamental, and that
fundamental rights are not limited to those that were traditionally protected); Williams, 41 F.
Supp. 2d at 1274 (asserting that a critical inquiry in substantive due process claims involves a
determination of the type of right involved).
37. See Reno, 507 U.S. at 302 (asserting that the government cannot infringe on a
fundamental right unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest).
38. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567 (stating that strict scrutiny is reserved for state
classifications that affect fundamental rights); Casey, 505 U.S. at 839 (referring to the strict
scrutiny analysis in Roe v. Wade, used to determine the constitutionality of state regulations on
abortion).
39. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567 (asserting that there is no established criterion for applying
intermediate scrutiny, but that it has been applied to restrictions that place an incidental
burden on freedom of speech, illegitimacy, and discrimination based on gender).
40. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727 (stating that where the asserted right is not considered
fundamental, the statute in question only needs to be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest); see also Stratton, supra note 33, at 772 (stating that under minimal rational review, the
court defers heavily to the legislature and allows a statute to stand if “the legislation has some
minimally plausible, even if unproven and unlikely, relation to a permissible legislative
purpose.”).
41. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (holding that the right to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion involves the right to decide whether to bear a child); Eisenstadt, 405
U.S. at 453 (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion . . . .”).
42. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (addressing the issue of privacy and wiretapping of phone
conversations).
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Court’s recognition of the constitutionally protected right to
43
privacy. Justice Brandeis stressed that the right to be let alone is the
most comprehensive right of individuals, one that should not be
penetrable by the government.44
The right to privacy is fundamental.45 Even though it is not
specifically set forth in the Constitution, it is provided through the
46
penumbras or “protective shadows” of the Bill of Rights.
Specifically, the penumbras surrounding the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments create zones of privacy
47
Several Supreme Court decisions
recognized by the courts.
regarding privacy rights addressed issues of sex and sexual conduct.48
Although there is no clear boundary or limit to the right of privacy, it
49
50
is clear that personal decisions regarding marriage, marital privacy,
51
52
53
procreation, contraception, and abortion are among those
43. See id. at 478 (“The makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone . . . .”).
44. See id. (noting that a governmental violation of one’s privacy is a Fourth Amendment
violation).
45. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 926 (recognizing a fundamental right to privacy in cases involving
“procreation, childrearing, marriage, and contraceptive choice.”); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1, 20 (1995) (stating that the Fourth Amendment provides a check on official invasions of
the fundamental right to privacy).
46. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-84 (concluding that the long history of Supreme Court
cases analyzed provides a substantial basis to find a right of privacy in the Bill of Rights).
47. See id. at 494-95 (describing how the penumbras of the specific Amendments provide a
right to privacy); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing privacy through free association);
U.S. CONST. amend. III (providing protection of privacy by prohibiting the quartering of
soldiers in any house during peacetime without consent of the owner); U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(stating the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects from
unreasonable searches and seizures); U.S. CONST. amend. V (creating a zone of privacy through
the self-incrimination clause by protecting citizens from forcing their own detriment); U.S.
CONST. amend. IX (acting as a general, catchall phrase stating that “[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing a right to privacy through the liberty interest
of its Due Process Clause).
48. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality
of a statute, which criminalized consensual homosexual sodomy); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153
(providing women with a limited right to decide whether to have an abortion based on the
competing interests of the state and the unborn child).
49. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.”).
50. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (asserting that any law requiring an invasion into the
“sacred precincts of marital bedrooms . . . is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the
marriage relationship.”).
51. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (protecting the
right to have children by stating that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race.”).
52. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (extending the holding in Griswold to non-married
couples who want to use birth control).
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54

protected from unjustified governmental intrusion.

III. HOW THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY NECESSARILY
EXTENDS TO CONSENSUAL SEXUAL ACTIVITIES AMONG HETEROSEXUAL
ADULTS
Throughout history, the Supreme Court has faced a variety of
issues regarding the fundamental right to privacy, from child rearing
and family life to the right to bear or beget a child, and homosexual
sodomy.55 Early on, the Court limited the right of privacy to issues
56
concerning marriage and procreation. Five years after the Court
refused to address a Connecticut statute criminalizing the use of
contraceptives by married couples,57 the Court adopted the reasoning
58
59
of Justice Douglas’ dissent in Poe v. Ullman in Griswold v. Connecticut
and held the same Connecticut statute unconstitutional. This
decision opened the door to the issue of sexual autonomy and
60
privacy. Although some may argue that Griswold represented a right
to marital privacy61 and not a right to individual privacy, the Supreme
53. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 839 (upholding abortion as a fundamental right).
54. See id. at 851 (finding that decisions involving marriage, procreation, contraception,
and family relationships involve “the most intimate personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime.”).
55. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment establishes the right of an individual “to marry, establish a home, and bring up
children.”); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that
criminalizes homosexual sodomy); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (holding that a state law which required
children to go to public school unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents to raise their
children as they see fit); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding that a
state law which required children to go to public school unreasonably interfered with the liberty
of parents to raise their children as they see fit).
56. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (holding that the state statute authorizing sterilization for
certain criminals violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
marriage and procreation are fundamental to the existence of the human race); Daniel
Leonard Pulter, Note, Constitutional Line Drawing: Abortion Versus Homosexuality - Why the
Difference?, 12 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 865, 898 (1987) (noting that the decisions which framed the
constitutional right to privacy surrounded the marital union and procreation); see also Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 520 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the dismissal of the
case and arguing that making the use of contraceptives a crime violates the sanctity of a man
and wife).
57. See Ullman, 367 U.S. at 509 (dismissing the case for lack of a justiciable question).
58. Id. at 520-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the criminalization of “use”
contraceptive methods allows the state to enter and inquire in the privacy of the marital
bedroom).
59. 381 U.S. at 485-86 (making the right to use contraceptives fundamental under the
rubric of privacy).
60. See George W.M. Thomas, Note, Privacy: Right or Privilege: An Examination of Privacy After
Bowers v. Hardwick, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 875, 880 (1988) (asserting that the Griswold decision
defeated the Court’s reluctance to address the issue of sexual autonomy, and thereby created a
right to privacy that protected concepts related, but not confined to marriage and family).
61. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (acknowledging that the right of marital privacy is
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Court clarified its intention seven years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird.
In Eisenstadt, the Court’s holding clarifies the nexus between the
63
right to privacy and personal autonomy. In Eisenstadt, the Court
accepted its first opportunity of many opportunities to expand the
fundamental right of privacy beyond the confines of marriage and
procreation.64 Justice Brennan declared the right to contraception an
“individual right,” one that is not specifically related to marital
65
status. Although Eisenstadt proved that the constitutional right to
privacy was not limited to married couples, the Supreme Court’s next
decision was more important because it expanded the right of privacy
beyond an individual’s home.66 Roe v. Wade67 extended the right of
privacy to include a women’s right to terminate her pregnancy.68 The
Court continued making decisions that broadened an individual’s
69
fundamental right to privacy.
The Supreme Court insists that its decisions involving the “right to
privacy” cases have not “definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes
70
regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior.” The line of cases
from Skinner to Roe, and their progeny, however, expand and
establish the fundamental right to privacy71 enough so that the
supported by numerous decisions of the court, as well as the history of the Ninth Amendment,
even though it is not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights).
62. 405 U.S. at 449 (finding unconstitutional the Massachusetts statute that banned the
right of single non-married persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy because the
statute violated the equal protection clause).
63. Id.
64. See id. (insisting that the fundamental right to privacy inheres in the individual and has
nothing to do with a married couple’s interest in procreation).
65. See id. at 453 (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion . . . .”).
66. See Pulter, supra note 56, at 887 (stating that Roe v. Wade was a “quantum leap from past
privacy analysis.”).
67. 410 U.S. at 153.
68. See id. (stating that the right to an abortion is founded in the right to personal
autonomy and bodily integrity).
69. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (extending the holding in
Danforth, by providing the fundamental right to minors to obtain contraceptives); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (giving minors the right to an abortion by
invalidating a statute requiring parental consent).
70. Carey, 431 U.S. at 689 n.5 (observing that the Court declines to specifically delineate
what adult sexual behavior is constitutionally prohibited).
71. See Mark John Kappelhoff, Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: Is there a Right to Privacy?, 37 AM.
U. L. REV. 487, 496 (1988) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)) (asserting that the zone
of privacy found in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment cannot be determined
by any formula or code; instead it is something that changes over time in response to changes
in values and mores). The right to privacy can only be limited by the basic values that underlie
our society; allowing a right to sexual privacy is one of these rights. See id.
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recognition of a fundamental right to sexual privacy is the next
72
logical step.
In 1986, the Supreme Court took a step backward when it
concluded that the statutory prohibition of consensual homosexual
73
conduct was constitutional. Bowers v. Hardwick was a departure from
the Court’s previous holdings regarding the right to privacy.74
Essentially, the holding narrowed the right to privacy so much that it
actually reshaped the right to its earlier form, where it only protected
personal decisions involving marriage, procreation, and family.75
Although the line of cases from Griswold to Roe strengthened the
protection of privacy as it related to marriage, procreation, and
family, the cases also recognized that the fundamental right to privacy
inheres in the individual.76 Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bowers conflicted with prior and subsequent case law.77
As previously noted, Eisenstadt is the link that solidified the
78
fundamental right to sexual privacy for all individuals. By extending
the fundamental right of privacy to decisions involving contraception
and procreation, the Supreme Court necessarily extends the
fundamental right of privacy to sexual conduct and intimacy.79
72. See id. (“Recognizing private, consensual sexual behavior as a fundamental right . . . is
therefore a logical progression in a long history of cases.”).
73. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96 (upholding a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy).
74. See Daniel Joseph Langin, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Right of Privacy and the Question of
Intimate Relations, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1443, 1443 (1987) (asserting that the Bowers decision was an
“anomaly,” because over the last two decades the Supreme Court expanded the scope of
activities protected under the fundamental right of privacy).
75. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189 (stating that there is no connection between family,
marriage, or procreation and homosexual sodomy).
76. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (finding that the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy
is protected, regardless of whether she is married or single); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 449
(asserting that although the decision in Griswold inhered in the marital relationship, the marital
couple is made up of two individuals who separately have the right to be free from
governmental intrusion); see also Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540 (holding that procreation is a personal
fundamental right).
77. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (granting the constitutionally protected right to have an
abortion); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 439 (extending the holding in Griswold to provide unmarried
couples the fundamental right to use contraception). See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming that a woman’s right to have an abortion is constitutionally
protected); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (providing married couples with the
fundamental right to use contraception).
78. See Claudia Tuchman, Note, Does Privacy Have Four Walls? Salvaging Stanley v. Georgia,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2267, 2286 (1994) (quoting Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of
Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 200 (2000)) (“[Eisenstadt] unmasks
Griswold as based on the idea of sexual liberty . . . .”). Other commentators note that the
protection given to sexual autonomy is not limited to procreation, but extends to include
“recreational” sexual behavior. Id.
79. See William C. Heffernan, Privacy Rights, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 737, 776 (1995)
(asserting that Griswold and Eisenstadt were not only about personal life, but specifically a
married couple’s right to seek sexual pleasure through the use of contraception); see also
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Basically, the use of contraceptives by non-married heterosexual
couples during consensual sexual activity is a non-procreative act that
80
is protected by the Constitution. Therefore, consensual homosexual
activity, which is also non-procreative, deserves the same level of
protection. The State should not interfere with consenting adults
engaging in an intimate and private sexual relationship.81
Even if the Supreme Court is not willing to find an express
fundamental right to sexual privacy, the right to sexual privacy may
82
still be protected, as it is incidental to other fundamental rights. In
Carey v. Population Services International, the Court considered a statute
83
that restricted access to contraceptive devices. Citing its decisions in
84
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth and Doe v. Bolton,85 the Supreme Court
held that state regulations that limit access to contraception are
subject to the same strict scrutiny standard as statutes that completely
prohibit access.86 The Court explained that although there is not an
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (asserting that the decision of whether to bear or beget a child
necessarily presupposes the right of consensual, heterosexual partners to engage in sex); Yorko,
690 S.W.2d at 268 (Clinton, J., dissenting) (asserting that the constitutional protection to
decide whether to bear or beget a child necessarily means that the same protection is given to
the decision whether to engage in sex at all); Tooley, 697 P.2d at 370 n.28 (holding that the duty
of the legislature is to adopt statutes compatible with a person’s right to engage in sexual
activities “to the extent” that the right falls under the fundamental right to privacy).
80. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (giving non-married people the fundamental right to use
contraceptives). Essentially, the Court extends the right to privacy beyond the area of
procreation and focuses more on an individual’s right to be free from governmental intrusion.
Id.
81. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“[A]lso fundamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s
privacy.”); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
63 (1973)) (“Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is ‘a
sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and
the development of human personality.’”).
82. See Jeffrey A. Barker, Comment, Professional-Client Sex: Is Criminal Liability an Appropriate
Means of Enforcing Professional Responsibility?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1275, 1331 (1993)(asserting that a
right that is not fundamental will still be protected if it is an integral part of an existing
fundamental right). For example, the right to choose a sexual partner is inherent in the
constitutionally protected right of decision in matters involving childbearing. Id. at 1332.
83. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 681 (discussing a New York law, which made it illegal for any
person to sell or distribute any contraceptive to a person under the age of sixteen).
84. See 428 U.S. at 56-57 (addressing abortion regulation issues such as parental consent
that were secondary to the right of abortion set forth in Roe v. Wade). Specifically the Court held
that requiring spousal and parental consent for abortion is unconstitutional. See id. The State
does not have the authority to proscribe an abortion and the State also does not have the
authority to give someone other than the patient, such as a spouse, that authority. Id. In either
case, the woman’s fundamental right of access to an abortion is limited because her right is
subject to the decision of another person. Id.
85. 410 U.S. 179, 199 (1973) (holding that a Georgia statute requiring women to have an
abortion in an accredited hospital subsequent to the approval of an abortion committee and
another physician was unconstitutional).
86. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 688-89 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 155) (delineating the criteria that
must be met for a statute to pass strict scrutiny: statutes will only be justified by a compelling
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independent, fundamental right of access to contraceptives, “such
access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally protected right of
decision in matters of childbearing that is the underlying foundation
87
of the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade.” It
would be paradoxical to conclude that the Constitution extends the
right of privacy to protect an individual’s right to obtain
contraceptive devices, but does not extend the right to privacy to
88
protect the act that necessitates them.
After the Supreme Court’s expansion of the right to privacy, and its
subsequent decision in Bowers,89 its refusal to grant certiorari in cases
involving private sexual conduct confuses lower courts faced with
similar issues.90 This confusion is evidenced by the fact that some
lower courts have applied the Supreme Court’s rationale for issues
involving the right of privacy in upholding the right to consensual
homosexual and heterosexual privacy.91 Thus, when the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the long recognized right of privacy and bodily
92
93
integrity in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court solidified the
assertion that the liberty interest that developed in Griswold,94
Eisenstadt,95 and Carey96 encompassed the right to engage in nonstate interest that is narrowly drawn to express the legitimate state interest).
87. Id. at 688-89.
88. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446-56 (extending the right of non-married people to obtain
contraceptives); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (1965) (providing married couples the right to obtain
contraceptive devices); Barker, supra note 82, at 1332 (applying the same analysis in the limited
context of choosing a partner with whom to use the contraceptives).
89. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188-90 (deciding that sodomy is not protected activity within the
penumbra of privacy rights).
90. Compare Oklahoma v. Post, 479 U.S. 890 (1986) (addressing the right to select
consensual sex partners, married or unmarried, and to engage in abnormal sex acts), and
Henry v. City of Sherman, 928 S.W.2d 464, 467-68 (Tex. 1996) (addressing the discharge of a
police officer for adultery suggests privacy extends to only certain heterosexual acts), with
Tuchman, supra note 78, at 2287 (bolstering the argument that the Supreme Court’s denial of
certiorari for a case involving heterosexual sodomy in Post v. State implicitly endorsed the right of
privacy in heterosexual sex, even sex acts deemed abnormal).
91. See generally Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that the
constitutional right of privacy extends to married people to engage in sodomy in the privacy of
their own bedroom); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940 (N.Y. 1980) (invalidating a state
statute criminalizing any act of sodomy between two people). Essentially, it was Supreme Court
precedent that provided the force behind these decisions. Id.
92. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 255 (1891) (recognizing the right of
an individual to be free from the restraint or interference of others). This is the earliest case
that notes a fundamental interest in the right to personal freedom. Id.
93. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade’s holding recognizing a woman’s right to
choose to have an abortion).
94. 381 U.S. at 485 (providing the fundamental right to obtain and use contraception).
95. 405 U.S. at 452 (expanding the fundamental right to obtain contraceptives to nonmarried individuals).
96. 431 U.S. at 694 (extending the right to obtain and use contraceptive devices to

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss2/4

12

Kaminer: How Broad is the Fundamental Right to Privacy and Personal Autono
COHEN.FINAL-FINAL.ASC

2001]

9/8/01 7:16 PM

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

407

97

reproductive sexual conduct.
Although marriage, procreation, abortion, and contraception cases
provide the constitutional right of personal autonomy, these cases
have not been interpreted to mean that all sexual conduct is beyond
98
state regulation. Every state has the unquestionable authority under
its police power to safeguard health, safety, comfort, morals, and
general welfare by such laws and statutes that are reasonable and
necessary for that purpose.99 The state law or statute, however, must
not invade a constitutionally protected fundamental right.100
Notwithstanding the Court’s holding in Bowers v. Hardwick,101 a law
that makes genital stimulating devices illegal is tantamount to
entering the privacy of a person’s bedroom to stop them from
engaging in sexual activity; a right that arguably has constitutional
102
The holding in Bowers recognizes that there are
protection.
fundamental rights that are not specifically set forth in the
103
However, the Court qualifies the rights by limiting
constitution.
them to those that are “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and
104
The right to engage in consensual heterosexual sex
tradition.”
minors).
97. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218 (arguing in the dissent that the right of married couples to
conduct their intimate relationships outside the eye of the State, includes the right of others to
engage in non-reproductive sexual acts regardless of offense taken by others).
98. See Linda Fitts Mischler, Reconciling Rapture, Representation, and Responsibility: An
Argument Against Per Se Bans on Attorney-Client Sex, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 234 (1997)
(discussing how the Bowers v. Hardwick decision does not make it easier for states to regulate
private sexual activity beyond homosexual sodomy).
99. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (setting forth the standard that a state
law must be fair, reasonable, and appropriate). Holding that a state statute limiting the number
of hours bakers may work unconstitutional because it violates an individual’s freedom to
contract. See id. But see Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (overruling in
part Lochner by asserting that a state legislature has the qualified constitutional authority to
regulate business in maintaining public welfare).
100. See generally Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (addressing how Americans sought protection in
their beliefs, thoughts, emotions, and sensations against Government in the right to be let alone
– the most comprehensive right and the right most valued by man).
101. 478 U.S. at 196 (upholding the constitutionality of a state law imposing criminal
sanctions for homosexual sodomy).
102. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 439 (expanding the right to use contraception in the marital
bedroom to use during sexual activity in all bedrooms); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (“Would we
allow the police to search the . . . marital bedroom for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?
The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding marriage.”). But see Bowers, 478
U.S. at 186 (stating there is no connection between the fundamental right to procreate and
engaging in homosexual acts in the privacy of one’s own bedroom).
103. See Heffernan, supra note 79, at 779 (“Bowers enunciates a compromise position on
unenumerated rights.”). The Supreme Court recognizes that the right to use contraceptive
devices is an unenumerated right, but justifies the protection of the right to obtain
contraception by linking it to marriage and procreation; rights that are deeply rooted in our
Nation’s history. See id.
104. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) and
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105
apart from procreation, as well as the right of privacy in one’s
106
together provide a foundation for expanding the
home,
fundamental right of privacy to include the use of genital stimulating
devices.
A dildo is defined as an object used for sexual gratification in place
of an erect penis, and a vibrator is a battery-operated or electric
107
version. Therefore, if one person is engaging in sexual activity with
these devices, they are engaging in activity that is the equivalent of
consensual sex that is not for procreation.

IV. OBSCENITY LAWS BANNING THE SALE AND PROMOTION OF
SEXUALLY STIMULATING DEVICES USED PRIMARILY FOR THE
STIMULATION OF HUMAN GENITALS
Kansas and Colorado recognize that the right to use genital
108
stimulating devices comes within the fundamental right to privacy.
However, both limit the protection of using the devices to married
couples and to people who use the devices for medical or therapeutic
purposes;109 both of which are recognized as fundamental rights.110
On the other hand, Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, and Georgia deny
that there is any fundamental right involved with the use of genital
stimulating devices.111 These statutes fall under the rubric of state
Moore, 431 U.S. at 503) (proposing that fundamental rights are those that are implicit in the
concept of liberty and that without them, neither liberty nor justice would survive).
105. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 (holding that minors have the same constitutional right to
contraceptive use as adults); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 439 (extending the right to use
contraception to nonmarried couples).
106. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (protecting the sanctity of the marital bedroom); Ullman,
387 U.S. at 521 (arguing that the state should not be allowed to enter into the sanctity of the
home); see also Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (protecting the right to view pornography in the privacy
of one’s home).
107. See ALAN RICHTER, DICTIONARY OF SEXUAL SLANG – WORDS, PHRASES, AND IDIOMS FROM
AC/DC TO ZIG-ZIG 65, 232 (1993).
108. See Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031-32 (holding that the statute impermissibly infringes on the
right to privacy in one’s home and in a doctor or therapists office); Tooley, 697 P.2d at 368
(holding that the statute impermissibly violated a persons right to privacy to use sexually
stimulating devices by prohibiting the promotion or sale of such devices).
109. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(2) (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (1995).
110. See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 66 n.13 (stating that the constitutional right to
privacy extends to the home and to one’s doctor’s or therapist’s office).
111. See Brenan, 739 So. 2d at 371-72 (following the analysis set forth in Williams and refusing
to recognize a fundamental right to use genital stimulating devices); Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at
1284 (following the Supreme Court’s reluctance to extend protection under the Due Process
clause, thereby refusing to extend the fundamental right of privacy to include the use of genital
stimulating devices); Yorko, 690 S.W.2d at 265 (failing to find any language in the Constitution
or in Supreme Court cases that provides a fundamental right to use genital stimulating devices);
Sewell v. State, 233 S.E.2d 187, 188 (Ga. 1977) (upholding Georgia statute that “any device
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obscenity laws where an “obscene device” is defined as any device
112
The
used primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.
fact that each of these statutes is imbedded in the State’s obscenity
statute gives weight to the assertion that the legislatures are not
willing to address the issue of sexual privacy. Thus, labeling these
devices as obscene is the legislature’s attempt to get around the issue
of privacy. However, obscenity is not a generic term that can be used
to label something that does not fit into the constitutionally
mandated framework.113
A. Sexual Devices as Obscene Per Se
The state legislatures in Texas, Georgia, Colorado, Kansas,
Alabama and Louisiana all define obscene devices as those used
114
Because
primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.
these devices are used to achieve sexual pleasure in essentially the
same way as “person to person” sex, the legislatures equate sex
and/or sexually stimulating devices as obscene.115 This regulation is
merely an underhanded way to achieve state regulation of otherwise
protected private activity.116 An analysis of the Supreme Court
holdings on obscenity shows that the state legislatures incorrectly
117
categorize these sexual devices as obscene.
According to the Supreme Court in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,

designed or marketed for the stimulation of human genitals is obscene.”).
112. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80(c) (1999) (stating that any device designed
primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs is obscene); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
43.21(a)(7) (West 1989) (criminalizing the promotion and possession of obscene devices,
including dildos when the primary purpose is for sexual stimulation and gratification); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(2) (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:106.1; ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (Supp. 1998).
113. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing guidelines to determine
what type of material is obscene).
114. See sources cited supra note 112.
115. Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031 (finding that the term “sexually provocative aspect” in the
Kansas Statute impermissibly equates sexuality with obscenity); Tooley, 697 P.2d at 370 (holding
that the language of the statute equates sex with obscenity). The Colorado legislature labeled
all genital stimulating devices as obscene, however the definition of obscene in COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-7-101(1) and (2) (1999) excludes these devices. Thus it is unclear whether the
devices are obscene. See Tooley, 697 P.2d at 370 n.28 (providing analysis of how legislatures
should classify sexual devices).
116. See Yorko, 690 S.W.2d at 268 n.5 (Clinton, J., dissenting) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957)) (“In saying that obscene material and obscene devices are used for
the same purpose, surely the majority does not mean to equate lustful thoughts with private
sexual activity. If it does, some supporting authority would aid one in comprehending the
equation.”).
117. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 487-88 (expressly stating that sex and obscenity are not
synonymous).
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Inc.,118 the traditional explanation of obscenity is material whose
“predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or
119
In Miller v.
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.”
California,120 the Supreme Court established a guideline to determine
121
what material is obscene. The guideline focuses on a narrow scope
of works that depict or describe sexual conduct.122 Despite the State’s
broad power to regulate obscenity,123 these devices do not pass the
Miller three-prong test. As a result, sexually stimulating devices cannot
be obscene per se. First, these devices do not depict or describe
sexual conduct. Second, they are used in a healthy and private way to
124
125
achieve sexual pleasure or for therapeutic value. Therefore, the
devices cannot be considered prurient.126 Even if the legislature
succeeds in proving that the devices fit into one or more of the
standards set forth by Miller, the devices are protected under Stanley v.
Georgia,127 which held that the mere private possession of obscene
material is protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.128

118. 472 U.S. 491, 493-94 (1985) (upholding a Washington State moral nuisance statute,
which establishes criminal and civil penalties for places dealing in lewd films or publications).
119. Id. at 497 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2)) (Tent. Draft No. 6 1957).
120. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
121. See id. at 24 (setting forth the following test to determine what material is obscene: (1)
Whether an average person under contemporary community standards would find the material
appealing to prurient interest; (2) Whether the material depicts or describes sex in a patently
offensive way; and (3) Whether the material lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value). Each of these prongs must be satisfied to prove obscenity. See id.
122. But see Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031 (asserting that the Miller standards do not apply
because historically and currently, those “standards were set forth under the general
assumption that the obscene item will be a book, movie, or play, rather than a device.”).
123. See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69 (holding that States may make moral and neutral
judgments that material is obscene, but that they only have a legitimate interest in regulating
commerce and exhibition of obscene material in places of public accommodation); see also Roth,
354 U.S. at 497-98 (asserting that the fact a state can regulate does not mean there are no
barriers to that regulation).
124. See WILLIAM H. MASTERS ET AL., HETEROSEXUALITY 198 (1994) (stating that vibrators
deliver much more focused and intense stimulation).
125. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5490 & 5960 (1984) (regulating the sale of general vibrators for
therapeutic use in the treatment of sexual dysfunction).
126. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (defining prurient interest as patently
offensive representations or descriptions of normal or perverted sexual acts or the description
of masturbation, excretory functions, or lewd exhibition of the genitals).
127. 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
128. See id. (stating that although states do have broad power to regulate obscenity, this does
not extend to private possession). The right of an individual to read or observe what he pleases
is a fundamental right. Id.
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V. FACTUAL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND THE COURT’S
DECISIONS
Over the past twenty-two years, several claims were brought in state
courts regarding the constitutionality of statutes that ban the sale or
promotion of devices used primarily for the stimulation of human
129
Georgia130 and Texas131 each upheld the constitutionality
genitals.
of their statutes by attributing their existence to state police power.132
On the other hand, the statutes in Louisiana, Alabama, Kansas, and
133
The Kansas and
Colorado, did not survive judicial scrutiny.
Colorado courts determined that their statutes were unconstitutional
because they violated the fundamental right to privacy.134 The
135
Alabama and Louisiana courts rejected the privacy argument and
issued injunctions because the statutes did not pass rational review.136
Based on the assumption that sexually stimulating devices cannot

129. See Tooley, 697 P.2d at 367 (contending that the statutory provisions regulating the sale
of obscene devices infringes on the due process rights of purchasers of such products); Yorko,
690 S.W.2d at 262 (claiming the statute violates the fundamental right of privacy set forth in
Griswold and Roe); Sewell v. State, 233 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. 1977) (claiming the right to sell obscene
materials, including an artificial vagina, were rejected by the court). See, e.g., Williams v. Pryor,
41 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999); Louisiana v. Brenan, 739 So. 2d 368 (1st Cir. 1999); State
v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1990).
130. See Sewell, 233 S.E.2d at 188 (holding that a statute that makes any device used primarily
for the stimulation of the human genitals obscene, is not unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad).
131. See Yorko, 690 S.W.2d at 266 (asserting that the exercise of police power is sufficient
rationale to criminalize the promotion of obscene devices used primarily for the stimulation of
human genital organs).
132. See First Nat’l Benefit Soc’y v. Garrison, 58 F. Supp. 972, 990 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (stating
that the Police Power has no exact definition, but that it “comes to the rescue of laws of doubtful
constitutionality” assuming those laws are enacted to sustain public morality, good order and
manners, contribute to public health and safety).
133. See Brenan, 739 So. 2d at 371-72 (stating that under rational review, the Louisiana
obscenity statute lacked a reasonable, rational relationship to a legitimate state interest);
Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1289 (holding that the Alabama obscenity statute fails rational basis
review); Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031 (demonstrating the state’s failure to prove a sufficiently
compelling interest to ban the distribution of genital stimulating devices); Tooley, 697 P.2d at
370 (finding that the Texas obscenity statute impermissibly burdens the right to privacy in a
doctor or therapist office).
134. See Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031 (holding that the Kansas statute banning the sale of sexual
devices unconstitutionally infringes on the right to privacy); Tooley, 697 P.2d at 353 (holding
that the Colorado statute banning the sale of obscene sexual devices impermissibly infringed on
the plaintiff’s fundamental right to privacy).
135. See Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 (stating that the Supreme Court placed the “bar too
high” to recognize the use of sexually stimulating devices as a fundamental liberty interest).
136. See id. at 1288-89 (holding the Alabama statute banning the sale of obscene sexual
devices unconstitutional because it lacked a reasonable and rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest); see also Brenan, 739 So. 2d at 370-72 (following both the reasoning and the
holding in Williams v. Pryor, thereby concluding that the Louisiana statute could not withstand
rational review).
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137
be considered obscene, the state courts in Alabama, Louisiana,
Colorado, and Kansas correctly issued injunctions to their existing
statutes. Nevertheless, the Alabama and Louisiana courts are at fault
for dismissing the issue of privacy.138 While Colorado and Kansas
recognized fundamental rights as the basis for their decision, both of
the courts qualified their decisions by limiting the right to a certain
group of people, namely those using the devices for medical and
therapeutic purposes.139

A. States Upholding Statutes Banning the Sale of Obscene Sexual Devices
140
In Sewell v. State, the appellant challenged his conviction under
141
the Georgia obscenity statute for selling an artificial vagina to an
undercover police officer. The appellant claimed that the statute was
142
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Because the Georgia statute
construes dildos and artificial vaginas as obscene per se, there is no
question as to whether they are constitutionally protected.143
Essentially, the statutory construction allows the Georgia state courts
to invade the fundamental right to privacy without broaching the
issue of constitutionality.144
The Texas obscenity statute banning the sale of obscene sexual
145
devices was modeled after the Georgia obscenity statute. In Yorko v.
State, Kenneth Alan Yorko was criminally charged with the possession

137. See supra Part IV.
138. See supra text accompanying note 136.
139. See Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031 (narrowing the scope of protection to those people who
use the devices for medical or therapeutic purposes); Tooley, 697 P.2d at 370 (stating that the
statute impermissibly burdens the right of privacy for those seeking to use the devices for
medical or therapeutic reasons).
140. 233 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. 1977).
141. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80(c) (1999) (stating that any device designed primarily for
the stimulation of human genital organs is obscene).
142. See Sewell, 233 S.E.2d at 188 (holding that the language of the statute “any device
designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs is
obscene material,” was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad).
143. See id. at 189 (stating that as long as the device in question falls under the statute, it is
obscene as a matter of law. Thus, no protected expression is involved); see also Trotti v. State,
242 S.E.2d 270, 271 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (declaring the Miller standards irrelevant to determine
whether the devices are obscene).
144. See Randolph N. Wisener, Note, Criminal Law-Obscenity-State Police Powers Justify the
Legislative Proscription and Criminalization of the Sale or Promotion of Devices Which are Designed or
Manufactured for the Purpose of Stimulating Human Genital Organs, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1125, 1135
(1986) (asserting that because the Georgia statute declares the devices obscene per se, the state
successfully bypasses the Miller three-prong test to determine what material is obscene because
the devices cannot expect constitutional protection).
145. See Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1027 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that
the Texas statute defining obscene devices, as dildos and artificial vaginas for the stimulation of
human genital organs as obscene per se, is patterned on the Georgia obscenity statute).
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146
Although other portions of the
of a dildo with the intent to sell.
Texas obscenity statute have been challenged and declared
147
unconstitutional, the portion of the statute dealing with devices
used primarily for the stimulation of human genitals was upheld in
148
The legislative intent behind this portion of the
every instance.
statute involves state police power.149 Notwithstanding the fact that
the devices are considered obscene per se, and therefore, will not
receive any constitutional protection, Mr. Yorko recognized and
asserted that the State exceeded its police power by depriving him of
his right to use his property as he chooses.150 If the state protects the
right to have sex, how can it prohibit the right to obtain devices that
are used during sex? Texas law does not ban the possession of
obscene devices used to stimulate human genital organs;151 thus, there
is no justifiable explanation for a law that prohibits transfer of the
152
The Court in Yorko
devices from one person to another.
successfully skirted the privacy issue by playing the “police power
153
However, even a state’s police power cannot withstand
card.”
judicial scrutiny when it impinges on a fundamental right.154 Texas
does not ban the stimulation of the human genitals, or the right to

146. 690 S.W.2d at 273 (holding that the plaintiff had the right to privacy in the dildo he
possessed with intent to sell).
147. See Davis v. State, 658 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (declaring
unconstitutional the portion of the statute that provided a mandatory presumption that the
defendant knew that the item he/she was selling was obscene); Hall v. State, 646 S.W.2d 489,
491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (holding that the presumption that a person who possesses six or
more obscene devices has the intent to sell is unconstitutional).
148. See Regaldo v. State, 872 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding the notion that
there is no fundamental right to use obscene devices, therefore the restriction on them does
not burden any fundamental right); Red Bluff Drive-In, 648 F.2d at 1027-28 (holding that the
Texas statute banning the sale of obscene sexual devices is constitutional and that there is no
evidence of a constitutional right to these devices for handicapped individuals).
149. See Yorko, 690 S.W.2d at 266 (upholding the State’s authority to ban obscenity under
the police power in order to protect “the social interest in order and morality”).
150. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 (providing that “no citizen of this State shall be deprived of
life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the
due course of the law of the land.”).
151. See Yorko, 690 S.W.2d at 263 (stating that the Texas obscenity statute does not
criminalize the use of obscene devices or the mere possession of them unless there is an intent
to promote).
152. See id. at 266 (offering the argument that there is no justification for such a law other
than to “assuage some purported community outrage directed against . . . a piece of latex.”).
153. See id. (justifying the state’s use of police power to protect morality). This protection
includes criminalizing the sale or promotion of devices used to stimulate human genital organs.
154. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 524 (asserting that under a State’s police power, as long as the
law is reasonable and substantially related to the object sought to be obtained, and as long as it
does not infringe or burden a constitutionally protected right, it will be upheld); see also Yorko,
690 S.W.2d at 273 (holding that the appellant had the right to privacy in the device he intended
to sell, and therefore, falls outside the State’s zone of police power).
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have sex for a reason other than procreation. Therefore, Texas
cannot constitutionally ban access to devices, which aid in sexual
activity. In light of this analysis, the court in Yorko fails to sufficiently
support its legitimate state interest in banning the sale of obscene
155
sexual devices.
B. States That Issued Injunctions Against Statutes Banning the Sale of
Obscene Sexual Devices Under Rational Basis Review
The Northeastern District Court in Alabama156 issued a permanent
157
injunction against the enforcement of a statute that prohibited the
sale of sexual devices used primarily for the stimulation of human
158
genital organs. The plaintiffs, including both vendors and users of
sexual devices, argued for injunctive relief on the basis that the
statute infringed on their fundamental right to privacy and personal
autonomy.159 Although the Alabama court considered fundamental
rights in general, it focused its attention on the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to expand fundamental rights, and followed their lead by
refusing to expand the fundamental right to privacy to include
genital stimulating devices.160
In Alabama, the district court focused specifically on the right to
use the proscribed products, thereby recognizing the inherent
argument that the contraception cases must be the controlling
161
precedent. However, the court also heeded the warning that even
with the many rights and liberties protected by due process, not all
162
Once
important, intimate, and personal decisions are protected.
155. See Wisener, supra note 145, at 1129 (asserting that the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals improperly and summarily dismisses the privacy issue by failing to address whether the
right of sexual privacy extends to consenting adults).
156. See Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1293 (granting the plaintiffs request for permanent
injunctive relief, and thereby barring the enforcement of the Alabama obscenity code because
it lacked a reasonable, rational relationship to a legitimate state interest).
157. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (Supp. 1998) (criminalizing the distribution of
“any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital
organs for anything or pecuniary value.”).
158. See id. (including devices that depict human genitals such as penis-shaped dildos and
artificial vaginas).
159. See Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1274 (seeking the extension of the right to privacy, not
the recognition of a new right).
160. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992) (“The Court has
always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.”).
161. See Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1281 (holding that although both parties try to
distinguish the sale, distribution, and marketing of the products from the use of the products,
the court states that the only way to resolve the issue is by focusing on the proscribed use). This
is equivalent to the fundamental right to use contraceptive devices. See supra Part III.
162. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., concurring) (holding that the right to

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss2/4

20

Kaminer: How Broad is the Fundamental Right to Privacy and Personal Autono
COHEN.FINAL-FINAL.ASC

2001]

9/8/01 7:16 PM

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

415

the court established this argument, the plaintiffs lost their case on
the basis of privacy. Because the court did not recognize the use of
sexually stimulating devices as a liberty interest “deeply rooted” in our
nation’s history and tradition, such that neither liberty nor justice
163
would exist if the right was sacrificed, Alabama’s obscenity statute
was automatically given rational review.164
The Alabama District Court found that the State had a legitimate
165
interest in banning public displays of obscene material, and as a
result it had a legitimate interest in banning the commerce of such
devices. The legislature justified this by asserting that public morality
may be directly attributed to what is sold without state regulation.166
The statute did not, however, withstand rational review.167 First, the
court found that protecting children and unwilling adults from
obscene material, although legitimate, was too discrete to support the
entire statute.168 Second, the court held that because the statute only
banned the commerce of devices used to achieve auto-eroticism and
sexual stimulation, it was not sufficient to ban the actual commerce of
those activities.169 Third, because married people use the devices for
therapeutic reasons, banning their sale interferes with the right to
170
Finally, the devices are void of
marriage and procreation.
expression and, therefore, do not merit review under any
171
constitutional standard.
The Alabama District Court responded by issuing an injunction on
assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest and therefore, Washington’s ban was not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
163. See Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 749-50) (stating that
the statute escaped strict scrutiny).
164. See id. at 1284 (asserting that the Supreme Court placed the bar too high for
constitutional protection for sexually stimulating devices).
165. See id. at 1286 (describing how Alabama’s interest in a sense of public morality is a
legitimate state interest). The purpose of the statute was to protect children and “unwilling”
adults from exposure to obscene material. Id.
166. See id. at 1287-88 (suggesting that the same issues of morality apply with equal weight to
a ban on commerce of obscene material).
167. See id. at 1284 (asserting that although there was a conceivable state interest at stake,
the statute was not reasonably related to that interest); see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319
(1993) (stating the presumption of validity for challenged legislation that does not involve
fundamental rights or uses “suspect lines.”).
168. See Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (holding that while the interest may have been the
basis for enacting the Act, it is too discrete to support the prohibition).
169. See id. at 1289 (stating that a statute banning prostitution is more likely to achieve its
goal).
170. See id. (stating that the use of the devices by married couples as an marital aid is proven
by expert testimony as well as the Food and Drug Administration).
171. See id. at 1291 (holding that the devices cannot be considered obscene under the Miller
three-prong obscenity test because the test only applies to expressive products).
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the obscenity statute, but it did so for the wrong reasons. In its
analysis, the court expressly recognized that banning the sale of the
devices interferes with the sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism
related to the fundamental rights of marriage, procreation, and
172
family relationships. The court emphasized that proscription of the
devices affects only married people, and only married people use
them for therapeutic purposes.173 It is irrelevant that the State
Legislature refers to these devices as “marital aids” because the
decision in Eisenstadt placed single people on equal ground with
married people in the realm of sexual pleasure and privacy.174 This
assertion undercuts to the legal fallacy behind the decision in the
case. The failure to apply strict scrutiny to protect those fundamental
rights, necessarily lowered the constitutional bar for state statutes that
175
Thus, Alabama
invade a person’s fundamental right to privacy.
undermined its own reasoning regarding why obscene sexual devices
may not be covered under the fundamental right to privacy.
Not even four months after the Alabama decision, Louisiana relied
on Alabama’s precedent to declare its own obscenity statute
176
Unfortunately, because the Louisiana Circuit
unconstitutional.
Court relied so heavily on the analysis in Williams, the Louisiana court
did not discuss the fundamental right to privacy.177 Instead, it
178
analyzed the statute under rational basis review. The State justified
the statute as an act of police power to protect children and
172. See id. at 1288 (finding the commerce of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism for its
own sake, outside of marriage and procreation, is obscene and subject to regulation). The
court recognized that a general ban on the commerce of these devices prevents married
couples from engaging in the genital stimulation and auto-eroticism. However, the court gave
married couples constitutional protection to engage in these acts by attributing them to
marriage and procreation. See id. at 1289.
173. See Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (noting that married couples use the devices as
treatment for sexual dysfunction, and specifically focusing on expert testimony geared toward
use by married couples).
174. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 452 n.8 (“It is inconceivable that the need for health controls
varies with the purpose for which the contraceptive is to be used when the physical act in all cases
is one and the same.”) (emphasis added). Single people engage in sex for the same reasons as
married people especially when neither are trying to procreate. See id. at 452. Therefore, all
people should have the right to achieve the maximum amount of pleasure either alone, or with
their partner, or spouse. Id.
175. See Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (justifying the holding with the assertion that the
right to marriage and procreation is violated; therefore, the statute must be at least rationally
related to the state interest).
176. See Brenan, 739 So. 2d at 371-72 (holding that the statute was not a reasonable use of
police power and, therefore, violates due process).
177. See id. (following the rationale of Williams v. Pryor finding that the statute could not
withstand rational review).
178. See id. (citing City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078, 1081 (La. 1978))
(determining that a statute’s reasonableness is based on whether there is a real and substantial
relationship between the regulation and the prevention sought).
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179
unconsenting adults from viewing obscene material. The wording
of the statute accomplished its goals, and although the court found
the regulation of the devices rational, it held that the statute swept
too broadly as applied to a commercial vendor.180 Adults have the
ability to avoid things they find offensive, and because children are
not permitted to purchase obscene material, the court determined
that the state’s goals were achievable, but in a much less restrictive
181
way.
Similar to the analysis provided by the courts in Sewell, Yorko, and
Williams, the Louisiana Court of Appeal failed to identify the
importance of the fundamental right to privacy that is inherent in
sexual autonomy. The Louisiana court recognized that the statute
was not based on ownership, possession, or use of the devices,182 and
it recognized that a ban surpassed allowable State police power.183
However, the court did not realize that even with a less restrictive ban
on access to genital stimulating devices it would still be interfering in
a person’s right to privacy.

C. States That Issued Injunctions Against Statutes Banning the Sale of
Obscene Sexual Devices for Violating the Fundamental Right to Privacy
184
185
The Colorado Supreme Court and the Kansas Supreme Court
each sustained a challenge to their obscenity statutes and held that
the statutes were excessively broad and burdensome on the
fundamental right to privacy.186 These holdings are the closest that
any of the state’s decisions come to expanding the fundamental right
of privacy to include private access and use of genital stimulating
device.187 Both states limited their holdings, however, to individuals

179. See id. (stating that this is what prompted the investigation of the defendant’s store and
her subsequent arrest).
180. See id. at 4.
181. See Brenan, 739 So. 2d at 372-73 (suggesting advertising regulations or licensing for
dealers of obscene devices).
182. See id. (noting that the only way to regulate these activities is through bedroom police).
183. See id. (stating that although some regulation of obscene devices is within state power,
the statute in question exceeds the limit of the state’s legitimate interest in this type of
regulation).
184. See Tooley, 697 P.2d at 353 (challenging the validity of the Colorado obscenity statute).
185. See Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031-32 (discussing whether the Kansas obscenity statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad).
186. See Tooley, 697 P.2d at 348 (holding that the right to privacy of purchasers of obscene
devices is impermissibly infringed upon by statutes banning the sale of such devices); Hughes,
792 P.2d at 1031 (holding that the right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is
violated by a statute banning the sale of genital stimulating devices, to the extent that the
devices are used therapeutically).
187. See Brenan, 739 So. 2d at 371-72 (using rational review to hold the statute banning the
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188
For all intents and
who use the devices for therapeutic purposes.
purposes this puts a majority of individuals, who seek to use genital
189
stimulating devices at a constitutional disadvantage.
The court’s analysis in Tooley centers on the line of cases involving
190
Although the court
marriage, procreation, and contraception.
refuses to make a definitive decision on whether the state can
regulate genital stimulating devices in general, it does assert that the
specific language of the statute is too broad because it
indiscriminately bans the sale of all sexual devices.191 The court finds
that certain sexual activities are encompassed within the
192
constitutional right to privacy. In the future, this type of language
only strengthens an argument for a right to sexual privacy. However,
the court qualifies its decision under the auspice that the statute
impermissibly burdens individuals who use genital stimulating devices
for medical purposes.193 The court justifies its decision to limit
194
protection by protecting only the interests that it finds legitimate.
Thereby, it proceeds to humiliate the necessities of people who
cannot obtain a doctor’s order to use a genital stimulating device.
Similarly, the court in Hughes grounded its decision in the

sale of genital stimulating devices unconstitutional); Yorko, 690 S.W.2d at 266 (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute banning the sale of genital stimulating devices); Sewell, 233 S.E.2d
at 188 (upholding the constitutionality of a statute banning the sale of genital stimulating
devices).
188. See Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031 (agreeing with the holding in Tooley that the statute
impermissibly violates the privacy of people who use genital stimulating devices for medical or
therapeutic reasons); Tooley, 697 P.2d at 370 (holding that the statute impermissibly burdens
the right of privacy on people who legitimately use the devices for medical or therapeutic
purposes).
189. See Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 (citing JULIA HEIMAN & JOSEPH CATANIA, NATIONAL
SEXUAL HEALTH STUDY (1997)) (stating that current estimates establish that twenty percent of
the female population use vibrators). Many women use genital stimulating devices for reasons
other than sexual dysfunction. These uses include fear of contracting sexually transmitted
disease or lack of a sexual partner. See id. at 1263.
190. See Tooley, 697 P.2d at 369 (citing the list of Supreme Court cases that made the right to
privacy fundamental under the Fourteenth Amendment).
191. Id. at 369-70.
192. Id. at 370 n.28 (holding that any statutory scheme adopted by the legislature must be
compatible with a person’s right to engage in sexual activities, to the extent that those activities
are encompassed in the right to privacy). The court recognizes that the constitutionally
protected right of privacy includes the right to sexual activities. Id. It is unfortunate; however,
that the court asserts that the right to privacy only encompasses medical problems that are
related to sexual activity. Id. at 368 n.26.
193. See United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels of Super 8 MM Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 n.4 (1973)
(finding the statute unconstitutional because there is a constitutionally protected right to
privacy that encompasses intimate sexual problems).
194. See Tooley, 697 P.2d at 368 (legitimizing the use of sexual devices for therapeutic
purposes).
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195
With the application of a
language of the overbreadth doctrine.
196
strict scrutiny standard, the court found that the wording of the
statute invaded a person’s fundamental right to privacy, but limited
the right to encompass only those people who need the devices for
medical or therapeutic reasons.197 Surprisingly, the court went one
step further and provided protection to purchase the devices to
doctors, psychologists, and school faculty members, because without
such protection, each of these people could become criminally liable
for doing their jobs.198
The holdings of these two cases arguably affect individuals in the
199
affected
same way that the holding in Bowers v. Hardwick
homosexual individuals. In each of these cases, the plaintiffs sought
constitutional protection to engage in sexual acts in the privacy of
their homes without government interference.200 In the Bowers case,
this right to privacy is denied to individuals engaging in homosexual
201
However, there is no explicit limit on a heterosexual’s
sodomy.

195. See Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1030 (defining a statute as overbroad when it criminalizes
constitutionally protected conduct). The overbreadth doctrine usually applies to First
Amendment issues in matters related to conduct. See id. The Supreme Court has extended the
doctrine when a regulation infringes on the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
including the right to privacy and medical matters. Id. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (holding that a statute banning the sale of contraceptive devices was overbroad as a
health measure because it prohibited access to all unmarried people, regardless of their
medical necessity).
196. See Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1032 (asserting that a state regulation must be narrowly tailored
and bear a real and substantial relationship to the state’s interest when citizens’ rights are
involved).
197. See id. at 1031.
198. See id. at 1032 (stating how therapists would not be able to provide the means necessary
for therapy of their patients and teachers would be restricted from providing students with a
thorough education on such matters).
199. 478 U.S. at 196 (upholding the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing homosexual
sodomy).
200. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (arguing that his fundamental right
to privacy in his home was violated by a statute that criminalized private and consensual
homosexual sodomy), with Louisiana v. Brenan, 739 So. 2d 368 (1st Cir. 1999) (arguing that the
statute unconstitutionally interferes with defendant and her customers’ right to privacy);
Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (claiming that the enforcement of the obscenity statute
imposes a burden on the fundamental rights of privacy and personal autonomy guaranteed by
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1030
(arguing that the obscenity statute was impermissibly overbroad when it impermissibly
burdened the fundamental right to privacy); Tooley, 697 P.2d at 353 (claiming that the obscenity
statute impermissibly burdened the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to privacy); Yorko, 690 S.W.2d
at 262 (arguing that the statute violated the plaintiff’s fundamental right to privacy announced
in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade).
201. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (stating that the issue was whether the constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy). The Supreme Court denies this
right by holding that sodomy cannot be connected with any of the cases that provide for the
fundamental right to privacy. See id. These cases involve the right to privacy in marriage,
procreation, and family. See id.
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202
right to engage in sodomy. Therefore, only select groups of people
are entitled to constitutional protection to engage in the same sexual
act. In the case of genital stimulating devices, select groups of people
are given constitutional protection under the fundamental right to
203
Because the
privacy to engage in sexual acts with certain devices.
court limited the use of these devices to people with medical needs,
the rest of the population seeking to engage in the exact same act are
denied constitutional protection.

VI. A LOOK BACK – WILLIAMS V. PRYOR, REVERSED, AND REMANDED
In January 2001, the Eleventh Circuit heard an appeal of the
Williams v. Pryor decision, and the small victory the Plaintiffs found
at the District Court level was squashed. The Eleventh Circuit held
that Alabama’s interest in public morality is a legitimate interest and
that the statute banning the sale of genital stimulating devices is
204
Further, the Eleventh Circuit
rationally related to that interest.
upheld the district courts rejection of the plaintiff’s facial challenge
to the constitutionality of the statute.205 The mere fact that the statute
prevents the sale of sexual devices to minors is enough to allow the
206
However, the Eleventh
statute to withstand rational basis review.
Circuit remanded the district court’s decision on the plaintiff’s as207
applied challenges to the statute.
The reasoning asserted by the Eleventh Circuit for overturning the
lower courts holding strengthens the argument that a stricter
standard of review should be applied in cases having to do with sexual
privacy. The current state of the law makes it too easy for state
legislatures to pass laws that invade people’s privacy and their
fundamental rights.

202. See id. at 191 (refusing to recognize a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy while
obviously neglecting to mention anything about heterosexual sodomy or sexual activity).
203. See Tooley, 697 P.2d at 370 (stating that the statute only impermissibly burdens the right
of people who want to use the devices for medical or therapeutic reasons); Hughes, 792 P.2d at
1029 (agreeing with the court in Tooley that the statute burdens the right to privacy for people
who want to use the devices for therapeutic or medical reasons). The only other groups of
people the court provides protection for are doctors, psychologists, or sex therapists because
these people need the devices to do their jobs. Id. at 1032.
204. See Williams, 240 F.3d at 948 (reemphasizing that a state’s police power is an
indisputable government interest under rational review).
205. Id. at 954 (noting that the court must determine whether the Alabama statute is broad
enough to invade on those fundamental rights already recognized by the Supreme Court).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 955 (holding that the district court did not adequately consider the as-applied
fundamental right of sexual privacy for the specific plaintiffs).
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CONCLUSION – A SUGGESTION TO EXPAND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
OF PRIVACY TO INCLUDE SEXUAL PRIVACY
The Supreme Court firmly asserted its unwillingness to recognize
new fundamental rights when it upheld a statute criminalizing
208
However, this does not preclude the
homosexual conduct.
expansion of already existing fundamental rights. In its most recent
decision addressing abortion, the Court implemented a new standard
of review for statutes that affect already existing fundamental rights.209
An undue burden analysis is a balancing test between the exercise of
a fundamental right or liberty and the effect of making the exercise
of that fundamental right more difficult.210 Because the undue
burden test imposes a lower level of scrutiny than a strict scrutiny
211
test, the evaluation of a state regulation under the undue burden
test may allow the Supreme Court to expand the existing
fundamental right of privacy to include the right to sexual privacy.
The right to use contraceptives is constitutionally protected
regardless of procreation or marital status,212 and the right to make
the individual decision to have an abortion is constitutionally
213
Therefore, the right to
protected regardless of marital status.
engage in private consensual sex of any kind must also be protected
regardless of procreation or marital status. This assertion will not
require that the Court find any new fundamental right, it merely

208. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (stating that the Court is not inclined to expand the list of
already existing fundamental rights imbedded in the due process clause).
209. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (stating that a regulation that imposes an undue burden on a
woman’s ability to make the decision of whether to have an abortion violates the liberty interest
protected by the due process clause); see also Kevin Francis O’Neill, The Road Not Taken: State
Constitutions as an Alternative Source of Protection for Reproductive Rights, 11 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
1, 20 (1993) (stating that the Casey Court established a new undue burden test for determining
the constitutionality of abortion regulations such that strict scrutiny will only be applied when
there is a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion).
210. See Kevin J. Curnin, Note, Newborn HIV Screening and New York Assembly Bill No. 6747-B:
Privacy and Equal Protection of Pregnant Women, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857, 900 (1994) (discussing
how the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey balanced each part of the Pennsylvania statute to
determine if that particular obstacle would make it too hard for a woman to choose an
abortion).
211. Compare Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (requiring statutes that restrict access to abortion to be
narrowly tailored in order to achieve a compelling state interest to survive scrutiny), with Casey,
505 U.S. at 877 (1986) (rejecting strict scrutiny analysis for an undue burden test such that a
state regulation will be considered unconstitutional if it places substantial obstacles in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion).
212. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (extending the right to use contraceptives to unmarried
people); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (holding that a law forbidding the use of contraceptives by
married people was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy).
213. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69 (holding that a statute requiring a woman to obtain spousal
permission before obtaining an abortion is unconstitutional); Roe, 410 U.S. at 115 (providing
women with the constitutionally protected right to have an abortion).
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requires that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment extend
214
to all aspects of an individual’s private sex life, including the use of
sexually stimulating devices.

214. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 853 (asserting that due process provides freedom from
governmental intrusion for matters “involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.”).
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